Thawing ties?

Yi Xianliang, deputy director-general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs met with his Japanese counterpart Makita Shimokawa, in the eastern Chinese coastal city of Qingdao on September 24-25, according to China's state-run news agency Xinhua. The meeting marked the first high-level bilateral talks on maritime affairs since May 2012.

Both sides "agreed, on principle, to resume maritime liaisons between defense agencies of the two countries," said Xinhua. Another round of consultations is set to be held later this year or early next year.

A day later, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe renewed his call to hold a summit with China, urging both Beijing and Tokyo to make "quiet efforts" to ease strains between the two Asian giants. Rising tensions have overshadowed Sino-Japanese ties in recent years with the Asian neighbors rowing over the ownership of an East China Sea island chain and over Abe's visit to a Tokyo war shrine.

James Brown, a Japan expert at Temple University's campus in Tokyo, says in a DW interview that while little of substance was agreed during the talks, they are a welcome sign of improvement given the intensity of tensions over the past two years. Moreover, the talks show that despite what some people may think, Chinese leaders do not want war with Japan and are alarmed by the prospect, he adds.

DW: How significant was this two-day meeting between Chinese and Japanese representatives?

James Brown: The Qingdao meeting is undoubtedly a significant development in that it gives hope that a particularly fraught period in Chinese-Japanese relations may finally be coming to an end.

Given the intensity of tensions over the past two years, which have included the genuine risk of armed clashes between the world's second- and third-largest economies, any sign of improvement must be warmly welcomed.

What were the results of the meeting?

The focus of the talks was on maritime issues, specifically with regard to the East China Sea. As to results, little of substance was actually agreed. To a large extent, however, this does not matter. What is important is that the meeting took place, as it indicates a mutual willingness to reduce tensions.

In particular, the hope must be that these talks are the first step in creating better lines of communication between the two sides, something that is essential to ensure that any accidental clash at sea does not escalate into a much more damaging international crisis.

Japan's largest trade delegation to China to date, made up of more than 200 business leaders, was in Beijing this week. Are the recent talks yet a further attempt to improve relations?

In general, one should not place too much emphasis on the size of trade delegations. Just because large numbers of business leaders are corralled to join an official trip does not necessarily mean that it will lead to improved economic ties. This case, however, may be somewhat of an exception.

Having grown rapidly in recent decades, Japanese-Chinese economic relations have stalled. Alarmed by the violent demonstrations of September 2012 and growing anti-Japan sentiment within the Chinese population, Japanese businesses have been reducing investment in China and redirecting it elsewhere.

Indeed, in the first eight months of 2014, Japanese investment in China was 43 percent lower than the comparable period in 2013. In the context of a slowing economy, these figures must be a concern to Beijing and may have encouraged efforts to rebuild economic ties. Suffering economic difficulties of their own, Japanese businesses are also likely to welcome such initiatives.

Why has it taken so long for Chinese and Japanese representatives to make such moves?

Nationalism is the key to understanding the contemporary difficulties in Chinese-Japanese relations. In China, the legitimacy of the Communist Party is based upon its delivery of economic prosperity, in combination with its claimed role of having liberated the country from brutal Japanese occupation. Despite the passage of seven decades, Beijing continues to find it useful to utilize Japan as an "external other" towards which to divert popular discontent.

In Japan too, nationalism is an important consideration, especially following the return to power of Prime Minister Abe in December 2012. His provocative visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, along with his controversial views on Japan's wartime record, make him an exceptionally difficult interlocutor for any Chinese leader.

Taken together, could all these steps be seen as indications that the tense relations might be thawing?

Taken together, the maritime security talks and the visit by the large trade delegation can be taken as a significant positive development. In particular, it is a reminder that, despite some people's thoughts to the contrary, Chinese leaders do not want war with Japan and are alarmed by the prospect.

With a recent survey showing that 53 percent of the Chinese public expect a war with Japan and 93 percent of Japanese having an unfavorable view of China, it was high time for the countries' governments to attempt a rapprochement.

The key to achieving a further reduction in tensions will be a summit between the countries' leaders. An opportunity for this is the APEC Summit, which is to take place in Beijing in November. Prime Minister Abe has expressed eagerness to meet his Chinese counterpart, but so far Chinese President Xi Jinping has refused.

As host of the summit, it may be difficult for Xi to shun Abe entirely. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Chinese side will grant a full bilateral meeting. At this stage, it seems more likely that any encounter will not extend much beyond a perfunctory handshake.

What are still the major obstacles for both parties to overcome when it comes to the East China Sea?

The economic and strategic issues relating to the East China Sea and the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are actually quite minor. The real obstacle is that these small islands and rocks have become symbols of national pride.

This makes resolution of the dispute all but impossible. With passions inflamed amongst both countries' publics, neither government can countenance offering concessions.

With this being so, the likelihood is that this week's improvement in relations will prove relatively short-lived. Given the intractable territorial dispute and continuing issues regarding historical memory, the long-term prospects for Chinese-Japanese relations continue to look deeply troubled.

Sooner or later, it is all but inevitable that another incident in the East China Sea or another politician's ill-considered statement will unleash another alarming resurgence in tensions.

James Brown is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Temple University, Japan Campus.