Two different movements?

In June 1989, several thousand Chinese college students and disgruntled citizens from all walks of life gathered in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to publicly mourn the death of purged high-level official Hu Yaobang, as well as demand government accountability, freedom of the press, and a stop to the rampant corruption plaguing the country. As demonstrations escalated, the Chinese government deployed the military to crack down on the protesters, opening fire on unarmed civilians and killing unknown numbers.

They are indeed some similarities between the protests 25 years ago and the pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong which are regarded by some as a new test to Beijing's authority in the special administrative region. Many Hong Kongers are angry at Beijing's refusal to allow genuine universal suffrage in the 2017 election of the city's Chief Executive.

Jack A. Goldstone, an expert on revolutions and social protest at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, says in a DW interview that while there are many parallels between the movements such as non-violent protests, and the demand for more democracy, there are also key differences in terms of organization, tactics, and media coverage which will likely lead to a different outcome of the protests this time around.

DW: There are many comparisons being drawn between the ongoing protests in Hong Kong and the mass demonstrations in Beijing in 1989. What do the protest movements have in common?

Jack Goldstone: There are several deliberate similarities: both began mainly as student movements; both are adopting the non-violent protest tactic of occupying a public space to show their determination and express their demands; both are calling on leaders to step down, and both called for more "democracy."

On October 6, for instance, students in Hong Kong further imitated their predecessors in Tiananmen by building a large figure to symbolize their movement, the statue of a protester with an umbrella outside the HK government headquarters. Another important aspect is that both movements have clung to non-violent tactics and civil disobedience.

What are the differences between the two in terms of their demands?

In 1989, students in Tiananmen Square asked for more democracy, but they were vague about what that meant: reducing corruption? Giving more power to the National People's Congress instead of concentrating it in the Politburo? Freeing media and public expression? Having Communist Party members elect the party leadership? very few students thought that the existing system of Communist Party leadership for China would be replaced by universal suffrage, open candidates, and competitive elections.

However, these are exactly what the 2014 Hong Kong protestors are demanding for the special administrative region. They want open, free, and competitive elections for leadership posts in the territory, instead of a system in which Beijing will screen candidates, reject most of them, and have a small group of elite supporters in Hong Kong anoint the approved candidates as the only allowed nominees.

Yet although the detailed demands are different, both the 1989 and 2014 protests are asking for top Communist Party leaders to surrender some of their authority to control the choice of their successors. So both movements posed major challenges to the Party's political control.

How do the movements differ in terms of organization and tactics?

The 2014 Hong Kong protestors have social media at their disposal which allows them to organize more invisibly - suggesting that this is a "leaderless movement," though it is not. It also allows them to quickly issue messages to move to different parts of the city.

Also, the 1989 movement committed itself to occupying Tiananmen Square; the 2014 movement is using multiple protest sites so that they can move around and evade or overmatch the police.

How has the situation changed in terms of news censorship?

Because of both the open media and international presence in Hong Kong, the Chinese government in Beijing cannot censor what transpires in Hong Kong the way it did in Tiananmen Square. That is why China wants to avoid any bloodshed in Hong Kong; there is no way to keep details of any violence by Chinese troops from being known over most of the world.

What is different about the way the authorities have dealt with the protests and why?

So far, this time the authorities have been more patient and seem willing to wait out the protests, especially if the protesters do not completely block critical business and government access routes. Even back in 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was initially patient with the students in Tiananmen.

While I believe that avoiding bloodshed is much more important this time for the CCP, there is no telling what might happen if protesters become violent, or if emulation protests calling for democracy should start to arise in mainland China. That might force the authorities to use stronger force to end the Hong Kong protests abruptly.

At this writing, the CCP seems to have decided to try to avoid direct conflict, wait out the protests, and block information on events in Hong Kong from the population on the mainland. Protest leaders also want to avoid violence. So the dance should continue for a while if both sides stick to their current tactics.

Do you believe this time around there will be a different outcome and some sort of compromise between the Hong Kong activists and the government?

I believe China will try to avoid violence in Hong Kong, but will want to resolve the protests while still appearing strong. This means entering talks with protest leaders to try to find a face-saving compromise.

I think several such compromises are possible: CCP leaders could ask for HK leader Leung Chun-ying to resign, but not change their announced election procedure. Or CCP leaders could maintain their plan to control official nominations for HK leader, but say that they will permit write-in ballots.

CCP leaders have already shown they are willing to back down to avoid violence in Hong Kong, as they did in 2012 in the face of protests over the introduction of a "national education curriculum" in Hong Kong's public schools. So I expect some kind of negotiated outcome, with CCP leaders making minor concessions to show responsiveness to protesters' demands but still retaining the major role in nominating future candidates for HK's leadership.

Jack A. Goldstone is Hazel Professor of Public Policy and a Fellow of the Mercatus Center of George Mason University in the United States. Goldstone is also a fellow at the Environmental Change and Security Program of the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars. He is also author of "Revolutions: A Very Short Introduction" (Oxford University Press).